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Research suggests that cognitive busyness and need for closure have similar effects on a host 
of consumer phenomena, leading some researchers to treat the two variables as substitutes. 
We propose that cognitive busyness and need for closure have distinct roots and can have 
different effects. We examine their distinction in the context of cultural differences in the two 
types of socially desirable responding – impression management and self-deceptive 
enhancement. Our findings indicate that high (vs. low) cognitive busyness weakens the 
relationship between culture and impression management, but not that between culture and 
self-deceptive enhancement. In contrast, high (vs. low) need for closure strengthens both 
relationships. The article concludes with a discussion of the theoretical, methodological, and 
practical implications of these findings. 
   
 
 
   3 
Consumers who respond to marketing surveys often do so under different contexts and 
have distinct motivations. For example, some consumers may respond to a survey while 
watching TV, which may distract their attention and limit their cognitive resources, whereas 
others may do so without any such distraction. In another example, some consumers may be 
under a deadline to complete a survey, which in turn may motivate them to make quick 
decisions and respond rapidly to the survey questions, whereas others may not face the same 
rush. Do these cognitive and motivational factors influence consumer responses to surveys? 
How do these factors influence recently uncovered cultural differences in the tendency to 
engage in socially desirable responding? Are the effects of these factors similar or distinct?   
Prior research suggests that cognitive and motivational factors have similar effects on a 
range of phenomena (Anderson and Slusher 1986), and that the two are indistinguishable 
(Greenwald 1975; Kruglanski 2001; Tetlock and Levi 1982). For instance, research reveals 
that consumers who are either cognitively busy (vs. non busy) or those who have a high (vs. 
low) need for closure exhibit a greater tendency to selectively process information and rely 
on heuristics to evaluate products (Kardes et al. 2004), to resist persuasion attempts in the 
presence of an opinion (Kruglanski et al. 1993), and to rely on primed constructs to interpret 
target information (Ford and Kruglanski 1995; Thompson et al. 1994). The widespread belief 
that cognitive busyness and need for closure have similar effects has led researchers to treat   4 
them as equivalent (Ford and Kruglanski 1995; Knowles et al. 2001; Kruglanski and Webster 
1991; Kruglanski, Webster, and Klem 1993). 
The current research examines how cognitive busyness and need for closure influence 
the relationship between culture and socially desirable responding. If cognitive busyness and 
need for closure are substitutable, one should expect similar effects of both. However, we 
suggest that because cognitive busyness and need for closure have different roots and follow 
distinct processes, in certain circumstances, they may work in different or opposite ways. 
Indeed, cognitive busyness influences the processing resources available to participants 
(Gilbert and Osborne 1989; Pontari and Schlenker 2000), whereas the need for closure 
influences people’s desire to quickly arrive at firm answers that provide epistemic closure 
(Kardes et al. 2004; 2007; Kruglanski and Webster 1996). 
Five studies support our theorizing and indicate that high (vs. low) cognitive busyness 
weakens the relationship between culture and impression management-- the tendency to distort 
responses to appear normatively appropriate. Further, high (vs. low) cognitive busyness does 
not influence the relationship between culture and self-deceptive enhancement – the tendency 
to provide exaggerated reports of one’s skills and abilities. In contrast, high (vs. low) need for 
closure strengthens both relationships. Next, we flesh out the assumptions behind our 
predictions and present the studies, followed by a discussion of the implications of our 
findings.   5 
COGNITIVE BUSYNESS AND NEED FOR CLOSURE 
 
Researchers have long been intrigued by the distinction between cognitive and 
motivational factors in people’s judgments (Anderson and Slusher 1986; Tetlock and Levi 
1982), with Kruglanski (1999, 55) terming it “the mother of all distinctions.” Most prior 
research, however, has not been able to distinguish between the effects of cognitive and 
motivational factors (Greenwald 1975; Kruglanski 2001; Sorrentino and Higgins 1986; 
Tetlock and Levi 1982). Tetlock and Levi (1982, 69) reviewed a range of findings attributed 
to these factors, and concluded that “cognitive and motivational theories are currently 
empirically indistinguishable.” A similar view has been expressed by Kruglanski (2001, 
42-43), who stated that “motivation and cognition are one, that is, in an important sense, 
motivation is cognition” (italics in original). 
In the present research, we explore how cognitive busyness as a cognitive variable and 
need for closure as a motivational variable affect cultural differences in socially desirable 
responding. Consistent with the findings above, research indicates that cognitive busyness 
and need for closure act similarly on numerous aspects of consumer behavior (Ford and 
Kruglanski 1995; Knowles et al. 2001; Kruglanski and Webster 1991; Kruglanski, Webster, 
and Klem 1993). For instance, high (vs. low) cognitive busyness or high (vs. low) need for 
closure makes consumers more resistant to persuasion when prior information about the   6 
target is available (Kruglanski et al. 1993), increases their tendency to rely on heuristics to 
evaluate products (Kardes et al. 2004), enhances their likelihood of assimilating thoughts 
towards primed constructs (Thompson et al. 1994), and intensifies primacy effects in 
judgment formation (Webster and Kruglanski 1994; Webster, Richter, and Kruglanski 1996). 
These and other similar findings have led some researchers to believe that cognitive 
busyness and need for closure are proxies of each other (de Dreu 2003; Ford and Kruglanski 
1995; Kardes et al. 2004; Webster, Richter, and Kruglanski 1996). Consequently, a number 
of researchers have attempted to induce need for closure by varying cognitive busyness (e.g., 
Knowles et al. 2001; Kruglanski and Webster 1991; Kruglanski et al.1993; Webster, 
Kruglanski, and Pattison 1997). For instance, previous research (e.g., Ford and Kruglanski 
1995) has attempted to increase need for closure by asking respondents to memorize a 
randomly chosen eight digit number, a commonly used procedure to induce cognitive 
busyness (e.g., Gilbert and Osborne 1989). In a number of other articles, need for closure was 
activated by increasing ambient noise (e.g., Kruglanski and Webster 1991; Kruglanski et 
al.1993; Livi 2003; Webster et al. 1997), which is another standard manipulation of cognitive 
busyness (e.g., Knowles et al. 2001; Kruglanski, Webster and Klem 1993, p. 873). Ford and 
Kruglanski (1995, 961) noted that “…variables shown to limit cognitive capacity, such as 
concomitant cognitive load…(likely induce) a need for closure.” Webster, Richter, and   7 
Kruglanski (1996, 183) concluded that “the state of mental fatigue (arising from cognitive 
busyness) induces the need for cognitive closure.” 
In this article, we propose that because cognitive busyness and need for closure have 
distinct origins and act via different mechanisms, they can sometimes have dissimilar effects. 
Cognitive busyness is a cognitive variable that affects working memory capacity and hence, 
the attentional resources available to the individual (Gilbert and Osborne 1989; Paulhus et al. 
1989; Pontari and Schlenker 2000). In contrast, need for closure is a dispositional variable 
that enhances craving for epistemic closure (Kardes et al. 2004; 2007; Kruglanski and 
Webster 1996). The former reduces people’s ability to perform certain tasks, whereas the latter 
increases their motivation to complete tasks quickly (Fu et al. 2007; Kruglanski et al. 1993; 
Pierro et al. 2003). In the next sections, we elaborate how this distinction can be examined in 
the domain of cultural differences in socially desirable responding. 
 
SOCIALLY DESIRABLE RESPONDING 
 
  Prior research has identified two types of socially desirable responding: 
self-deceptive enhancement (henceforth, self-enhancement) and impression management. 
Self-enhancement is the tendency to describe oneself in an inflated yet honestly held manner, 
and is motivated by the desire to see oneself in positive, overconfident light (Paulhus 1991;   8 
Paulhus and John 1998). It is linked to optimism, self-esteem, narcissism, hind-sight bias, and 
over-estimation of one’s skills, capabilities, and general knowledge (Paulhus 1991). In 
contrast, impression management is a deliberate and systematic attempt to distort 
self-reported actions in the most positive manner, to “fake good behavior,” and to provide 
normatively desirable responses in order to obtain social approval (Mick 1996). 
Some research findings suggest that self-enhancement is a spontaneous and unconscious 
response that requires little cognitive deliberation (Paulhus 1991; Paulhus and John 1998). 
Individuals who make unrealistically positive self-judgments often do so spontaneously 
(Greenwald and Banaji 1995) and believe in the truthfulness of these judgments (Paulhus 
1991). Further, they often cannot help but project an overly positive view of themselves in 
social situations, and seldom engage in critical reflection of the validity of their exaggerated 
positive self-views (Koole, Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg 2001). 
Conversely, impression management is a conscious, active, and deliberate attempt to 
fake good behavior in front of a real or imagined audience (Leary and Kowalski 1990; Mick 
1996; Paulhus and John 1998). Strategic impression management requires retrieval of 
relevant behavioral norms from memory, selection and careful calibration of responses with 
the retrieved norms, and estimation of the generalized others’ evaluations of the responses 
(Leary and Kowalski 1990). All these processes are effortful and require considerable 
cognitive resources (Vohs, Baumeister, and Ciarocco 2005). Accordingly, across eight   9 
studies, Vohs et al. (2005) found that engaging in impression management leads to depletion 
of self-regulatory resources. In short, the evidence suggests that self-enhancement is a 
spontaneous response that requires little cognitive deliberation, whereas impression 
management is a deliberate and effortful process that cannot be performed effectively without 
adequate cognitive resources. Hence, we hypothesize: 
H1: Cognitive busyness will reduce people’s tendency to engage in impression   
management, but will have no effect on their tendency to engage in 
self-enhancement.   
 
CULTURE AND SOCIALLY DESIRABLE RESPONDING 
 
Recent research suggests that the type of desirable responding pursued by people 
depends on their cultural self-construal– independent or interdependent. Because people with 
an independent self-construal are especially motivated to view themselves as self-reliant, 
skillful, and unique (Aaker and Williams 1998), they have been shown to engage in greater 
self-enhancement than those with an interdependent self. Conversely, because those with an 
interdependent self-construal are driven to seek social approval and avoid social disapproval, 
they are especially likely to provide normatively desirable responses, and hence, to engage in 
greater impression management than those with an independent self-construal. These   10 
relationships have been observed when participants are not cognitively busy (Lalwani and 
Shavitt 2009; Lalwani, Shavitt, and Johnson 2006; Lalwani, Shrum, and Chiu 2009). 
How might cognitive busyness influence these relationships? Because we expect the 
tendency to engage in self-enhancement not to be influenced by cognitive constraints (H1), 
we predict that cultural differences in self-enhancement will not be affected by cognitive 
busyness. That is, participants with an independent self-construal will engage in 
self-enhancement more than those with an interdependent self-construal irrespective of 
whether they are cognitively busy or not. 
In contrast, we argue that everyone’s tendency to engage in impression management, 
which is an effortful process requiring considerable cognitive resources, diminishes when 
they are cognitively busy (vs. non-busy). People with an interdependent self-construal, who 
have a greater tendency to engage in impression management, should be affected by 
cognitive busyness more than those with an independent self-construal. Hence, we expect 
cognitive busyness to diminish the ability of people with an interdependent (vs. independent) 
self to engage in impression management. That is, cultural differences in impression 
management observed in previous research should weaken or disappear, but those in 
self-enhancement should not be affected when participants are cognitively busy. Hence, we 
hypothesize:   
H2a: When not cognitively busy, participants with an interdependent self-construal will     11 
have a greater tendency to engage in impression management and a lower tendency 
to engage in self-enhancement than those with an independent self-construal, as 
observed in previous research. 
H2b: When cognitively busy, participants with an interdependent self-construal will no   
longer have a greater tendency to engage in impression management than those with 
an independent self-construal, who in turn will continue to have a greater tendency 
to engage in self-enhancement. 
 
The Role of Need for Closure 
 
As defined earlier, need for closure is a personal desire to quickly arrive at firm answers 
that provide epistemic closure (Kardes et al. 2004; 2007; Kruglanski and Webster 1996). An 
important means of attaining closure is cultural consensus; individuals feel epistemically 
secure when they use judgments and practices widely accepted in their reference or cultural 
groups as relying on them has minimal negative repercussions (Fu et al. 2007). Moreover, 
norms and practices associated with one’s culture (vs. other cultures) are more likely to be 
accessible to individuals, and a high need for closure is likely to lead people to “seize” and 
“freeze” on these accessible constructs and use them in forming judgments (Chiu et al. 2000). 
Accordingly, Americans with high need for closure have been found to be more likely to   12 
display American attributional styles, conflict resolution strategies, and reward allocation 
behaviors than Chinese, whereas those with a low need for closure are less likely to display 
these tendencies. Likewise, Chinese with high need for closure are more likely to engage in 
typically Chinese attributions, conflict mediation strategies, and reward allocation behaviors 
than Americans, whereas those with a low need for closure are less likely to do so (Chiu et al. 
2000; Fu et al. 2007). 
If need for closure increases adherence to normative practices within one’s own cultural 
group, cultural differences in socially desirable responding styles should be more pronounced 
among high versus low need for closure consumers. Specifically, a high need for closure 
should prompt people with an independent (vs. interdependent) self-construal to attain 
closure by engaging in self-enhancement, and should prompt those with an interdependent 
(vs. independent) self-construal to attain closure by relying on impression management. The 
differences between people with an independent and interdependent self-construal in 
self-enhancement and impression management should be weaker among people low in need 
for closure. Hence, we hypothesize: 
H3a: When need for closure is high, participants with an independent self-construal will   
have a greater tendency to engage in self-enhancement and a lower tendency to 
engage in impression management than those with an interdependent self-construal. 




Overview of Studies 
 
We tested our five hypotheses in five studies. Studies 1– 2 focused on cognitive 
busyness (H1, H2a and H2b), whereas Studies 3 – 5 focused on the need for closure (H3a and 
H3b). A multi-method approach was used to ascertain the generality of the results. The 
different operational definitions of culture include respondent ethnicity, salient self-construal 
that is contextually induced via priming, and direct assessment of chronic cultural orientation 
using standard scales. Similarly, self-enhancement and impression management were 
assessed with several different established measures as well as via scenarios that consumers 




The first study tested the assumption that impression management requires cognitive 
deliberation whereas self-enhancement does not (H1). While responding to the socially 
desirable responding (self-enhancement and impression management) measures, some 
participants were asked to engage in a cognitively demanding concurrent task (high cognitive 
busyness condition), whereas others were not (low cognitive busyness condition). Following 
H1, we predicted that additional cognitive demands would reduce participants’ tendency to   14 
engage in impression management, but would not influence their tendency to engage in 




  Participants, Design, and Procedure. The participants were 102 undergraduate students 
(40% female; age: 17 - 24) at a large university who participated in exchange for class credit. 
A 2 (cognitive busyness: busy, non-busy; between-subjects) x 2 (socially desirable 
responding: self-enhancement, impression management; within-subjects) mixed factorial 
design was used. As in numerous previous studies (e.g., Gilbert and Osborne 1989), we used 
memory load to manipulate cognitive busyness. At the start of the experiment, participants in 
the busy condition learned that the experiment concerned how people performed two tasks 
simultaneously. They were given and asked to memorize a randomly generated eight-digit 
number during the experiment. At the end of the experiment, we asked these participants to 
recall the number. Thirteen participants failed to provide the number accurately, and their 
data were removed from further analyses, although our conclusions were similar when these 
participants were included. This memory task was not given to participants in the non-busy 
condition. A pretest with 43 participants from the same subject pool showed that this 
manipulation was successful: those in the busy (vs. non-busy) condition found the experiment   15 
to be more demanding (Mbusy = 2.90, Mnon-busy = 1.64; t(41) = 3.21, p < .005). 
 
Measures. Two established measures each of self-enhancement and impression 
management were used. The self-enhancement measures were the self-enhancement subscale 
in the 40-item Paulhus deception scales (Paulhus 1991) and the RD-16 scale (Schuessler et al. 
1978), whereas the impression management measures were the impression management 
subscale in the Paulhus deception scales and the Marlowe-Crowne scale. A sample item from 
the self-enhancement subscale (α = 0.64) is “My first impressions of people usually turn out 
to be right” and one from the impression management subscale (α = 0.76) is “I have never 
dropped litter on the street.” All items in both scales were anchored from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). A sample item from the RD-16 scale (α = 0.73) is “The future 
looks very bleak” (reverse coded) and one from the Marlowe-Crowne scale (α = 0.80) is “My 
table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant.” The RD-16 scale was 
anchored by 1 (strongly disagree) and 9 (strongly agree), whereas the Marlowe-Crowne scale 
was anchored by 1 (generally false) and 9 (generally true). Our pretests confirmed that the 
RD-16 scale was positively correlated with the self-enhancement component of Paulhus 
deception scales (r = 0.49, p < .001) and uncorrelated with the impression management 
component (r = -0.04, p > .68). On the other hand, the Marlowe-Crowne scale was positively 
correlated with the impression management (r = 0.57, p < .001) but not with the   16 
self-enhancement component (r = 0.16, p > .14). 
Results and Discussion 
A general linear model (GLM) with socially desirable responding as within-subjects 
factor (using the RD-16 scale to measure self-enhancement, and the Marlowe-Crowne scale 
to measure impression management) and cognitive busyness as a between-subjects factor 
revealed a significant interaction (F(1, 87) = 6.75, p < .02). As hypothesized, cognitively 
busy participants had significantly lower impression management scores (M = 3.46) than did 
non-busy participants (M =4.13; t(87) = 4.10, p < .001). Also as expected, cognitive busyness 
did not affect self-enhancement scores (Mbusy = 6.59, Mnon-busy = 6.78; t(87) = 1.01, p > .31; 
figure 1). These findings indicate that depletion of cognitive resources affected impression 
management, which is an effortful and deliberative response, but did not affect the tendency 
to engage in self-enhancement, which is a spontaneous and non-effortful response. 
Another GLM with socially desirable responding as a within-subjects factor (using 
the self-enhancement and impression management components of the Paulhus deception 
scales) and cognitive load as a between-subjects factor revealed a marginally significant 
interaction (F(1, 87) = 2.72, p = .10). Again, cognitively busy participants scored 
significantly lower on impression management (Mbusy = 3.31, Mnon-busy = 3.73; t(87) = 2.79, p 
< .01), but not on self-enhancement (Mbusy = 4.00, Mnon-busy = 4.19; t(87) = 1.52, p > .13) than 
did their non-busy counterparts, as predicted.   17 
_____________________________ 
Insert figure 1 about here 
_____________________________ 
Convergent results from two measures of self-enhancement and impression 
management supported H1: Cognitive load impairs everyone’s ability to engage in 
impression management, but not the tendency to engage in self-enhancement. This result 
reinforces the assumption that impression management is an effortful process: When 
respondents are cognitively busy, as when they need to divert cognitive resources to perform 
a secondary task, they become less effective in generating impression management responses. 
In contrast, self-enhancement, being an automatic response, requires limited cognitive 




The second study was designed to test H2a and H2b. We predicted that among 
non-busy participants, priming an interdependent (vs. independent) self-construal would 
produce higher impression management and lower self-enhancement scores, consistent with 
prior research (Lalwani et al. 2006). We also predicted that cognitive busyness would weaken 
the effect of self-construal prime on impression management but not on self-enhancement. 
 
Method   18 
One hundred and thirty four students (58% female, age 20-37) at a large university 
participated in exchange for class credit. A 2 (salient self-construal: independent, 
interdependent; between-subjects) x 2 (socially desirable responding: self-enhancement, 
impression management; within-subjects) x 2 (cognitive busyness: high, low; 
between-subjects) mixed design was used. Two methods of activating the salient 
self-construal were used to demonstrate the generality of our results across methods. Some 
participants read a short story (Agrawal and Maheswaran 2005; Mandel 2003) and counted 
all singular first-person pronouns (I, me, my, mine) in the independent prime condition or all 
plural first-person pronouns (we, us, our, ours) in the interdependent prime condition. Other 
participants were asked to think for two minutes how they were different from (independent 
condition) or similar to (interdependent condition) their family and friends, and to write down 
these thoughts. Our pretests showed that in both manipulations, participants in the 
independent (vs. interdependent) prime condition scored significantly higher on Triandis and 
Gelfand’s (1998) 8-item scale to measure the independent self-construal (Reading story 
prime: MIND = 5.56, MINT= 4.98; t(38) = 2.36, p < .05; Writing thoughts prime: MIND = 5.34, 
MINT = 5.00; t(139) = 2.47, p < .05), suggesting that both these procedures were successful in 
making the desired self-construal (independent or interdependent) salient in the minds of 
participants. 
Following Knowles et al. (2001), participants in the busy condition listened to several   19 
songs of variable durations (from ½ minute to 2 minutes) during the experiment and were 
asked to keep track of the number of songs played. This manipulation was not given to 
participants in the non-busy condition. A pretest with 91 participants from the same subject 
pool showed that this manipulation was successful in making the experiment more 
demanding among the busy versus non-busy participants (Mbusy = 3.52, Mnon-busy= 2.43; t(89) 
= 2.29, p < .05). The 40-item Paulhus deception scale (Paulhus 1991) described in Study 1 
was used to measure self-enhancement (α = 0.73) and impression management (α = 0.79). 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Because the two types of priming manipulations did not interact with cognitive load and 
self-construal to explain socially desirable responding, the data pertaining to these were 
collapsed. As predicted, a GLM revealed a significant 3-way interaction between cognitive 
busyness (busy, non-busy), self-construal prime (independent, interdependent), and socially 
desirable responding (self-enhancement, impression management; F(1, 130) = 9.89, p = 
.002). In the non-busy condition, a self-construal prime x socially desirable responding GLM 
revealed a significant 2-way interaction (F(1, 66) = 4.29, p < .05), as expected. 
Interdependent (vs. independent) self-construal priming produced higher impression 
management (MIND = 3.26, MINT = 3.58; t(66) = 1.99, p = .05), but not self-enhancement   20 
scores (MIND = 4.06, MINT = 4.06; t(66) < 1). These findings suggest that when participants 
are not busy, impression management is associated with an interdependent self-construal. The 
insignificant difference in self-enhancement scores is not entirely surprising in light of 
previous research suggesting that although judgments assimilate towards salient constructs 
(Lalwani and Monroe 2005), they do so only when the primes are subtle but not when they 
are overt or blatant (Kuhnen and Hannover 2000). It is possible that the connection between 
the task used to activate the independent self (e.g., counting pronouns related to the self [I, 
me, mine]) and that of rating the self in the self-enhancement scale subsequently administered 
(sample items: “Many people think that I am exceptional,” “My first impressions of people 
usually turn out to be right,” “I am fully in control of my own fate”) was readily apparent and 
overt, nullifying the effect of the prime. The interdependent prime, on the other hand, was 
likely subtle and effective because the link between the prime (e.g., counting pronouns 
related to groups [we, us, our, ours]) and rating self-traits in the impression management 
scale (sample items: “I never cover up my mistakes;” “I always obey laws, even if I'm 
unlikely to get caught,” “I never swear”) was not readily apparent. 
Among cognitively busy participants, as evident in the significant 2-way interaction 
between self-construal and socially desirable responding (F(1, 64) = 5.62, p < .05), and 
follow up analyses, interdependent (vs. independent) self priming produced lower impression 
management scores (MIND = 3.51, MINT = 3.09; t(64) = - 2.63, p < .02), suggesting that these   21 
participants were less likely to engage in impression management. It is noteworthy that 
although we had predicted this effect to disappear, it actually reversed. The reasons for the 
reversal are not clear and should be examined by future research. Again, self-construal 
priming did not affect self-enhancement scores (MIND = 4.08, MINT= 4.17; t(64) < 1). 
The results of Study 2 suggest that an interdependent (vs. independent) self-construal 
led to significantly higher impression management tendencies in the cognitively non-busy 
condition, though the opposite was true in the cognitively busy condition. This, we argued, is 
due to the effortful nature of impression management, which requires considerable cognitive 
deliberation. Although cognitive busyness influences everyone’s tendency to engage in 
impression management (see Study 1), we predicted and found that it especially influenced 
people with an interdependent self-construal, who are more prone to the tendency, than those 
with an independent self-construal. In contrast, because self-enhancement is an automatic 
response that requires little cognitive effort, we argued and found that cultural differences in 
self-enhancement are similar in the cognitively busy and non-busy conditions. Further, salient 
self-construal did not influence self-enhancement scores, possibly because the prime was too 
blatant. Future research should reexamine this relationship using subtle primes. It is 
noteworthy that other research (Lalwani et al. 2006; 2009; Shavitt et al. 2006) has provided 
robust support for this relationship using a number of alternate operationalizations of culture. 
The next three studies tested the role of need for closure in the relationship between   22 
culture and socially desirable responding. We expect this influence to be different from that 
of cognitive busyness. Specifically, we predict that need for closure would increase cultural 
differences in self-enhancement and impression management. Among high need for closure 
consumers, we predict that participants with an independent self-construal will have a greater 
tendency to engage in self-enhancement than those with an interdependent self-construal, 
who in turn will have a greater tendency to engage in impression management. We further 







Participants and Design. Four hundred and fifty undergraduate students at a large 
university participated in exchange for class credit. A 2 (participant ethnicity: Western, 
Eastern) x 2 (socially desirable responding: self-enhancement, impression management) x 2   
(need for closure: high, low) mixed factorial design was used.   
   23 
  Measures. The 40 item Paulhus deception scale (see Study 1 for sample items) was used 
to measure self-enhancement (α = 0.67) and impression management (α = 0.78). Need for 
closure (α = 0.82) was measured by a 42-item, seven-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Sample items include: “I think that having clear rules and 
order at work is essential for success” and “I dislike it when a person’s statement could mean 
many different things” (Webster and Kruglanski 1994). Participant ethnicity was measured 
by the open ended question “With which ethnic group do you most
Based on their self-reported ethnicity, participants who indicated being from 
independent cultures (e.g., White, Greek, German, Irish, Italian, British, Australian, Canadian) 
we categorized as Western, whereas those who indicated being from interdependent cultures 
(e.g., Korean, Singaporean, Chinese, Hindu, Taiwanese) were categorized as Eastern. A 
GLM revealed a significant 3-way interaction between respondent ethnicity (Western, 
Eastern; between subjects), socially desirable responding (self-enhancement, impression 
management; repeated measures), and need for closure (F (1, 343) = 4.22, p < .05). When 
need for closure was high (as assessed by a median split), the 2-way interaction between 
ethnicity and socially desirable responding was significant (F (1, 167) = 19.39, p < .001). 
 identify yourself? _____.” 
 
Results and Discussion 
   24 
However, as predicted, this interaction became non-significant when need for closure was 
low (F (1, 176) = 2.07, p > .15), indicating that the relationship between culture and socially 
desirable responding disappeared at low levels of need for closure. 
Further analyses in the high need for closure condition revealed that Westerners 
scored significantly higher on self-enhancement than Easterners (MWesterners = 4.26, MEasterners 
= 3.95; t(167) = 2.66, p < .01), who in turn scored higher on impression management than 
Westerners (MWesterners = 3.57, MEasterners = 3.85; t(167) = -2.15, p < .05). However, in the low 
need for closure condition, no significant differences were observed between the scores of 
Westerners and Easterners on both self-enhancement (MWesterners = 4.18, MEasterners = 4.03, 
t(176) = 1.47, p > .14) and impression management (MWesterners = 3.36, MEasterners = 3.43; 
t(176) = -0.46, p > .64). These results support H3 and H3b, and suggest that high (vs. low) 
need for closure accentuated cultural differences in both self-enhancement and impression 
management. As predicted, these effects are different from those of cognitive busyness, 
which mitigated cultural differences in impression management, but had no effect on cultural 
differences in self-enhancement.   
An interesting aspect of the findings pertain to the manner in which need for closure 
moderates cultural differences in socially desirable responding. Specifically, high need for 
closure Western participants self-enhanced more than their Eastern counterparts, and this 
difference was smaller for low need-for closure participants. However, this result was driven   25 
both by low (vs. high) need for closure Westerners self-enhancing less (MLow NFCC = 4.18, 
MHigh NFCC = 4.26) as well as by low (vs. high) need for closure Easterners self-enhancing 
more (MLow NFCC= 4.03, MHigh NFCC= 3.95). Thus, cultural differences were attenuated for low 
need for closure groups, but the attenuation was driven both by one culture increasing 
socially desirable responding and the other culture decreasing the same type of socially 





Study 4 extended the previous study in two ways. First, it replicated the findings of 
Study 3 using different measures of socially desirable responding. Second, it examined the 




Respondents were 137 undergraduate students (58% male; 97% aged 20-23) at a large 
university who participated in exchange for class credit. The study utilized an ethnicity 
(Western, Eastern) x socially desirable responding (self-enhancement, impression   26 
management) x need for closure mixed design. The RD-16 scale (see Study 1) was used to 
measure self-enhancement (α = 0.77), and the Marlowe-Crowne scale (see Study 1) was used 
to measure impression management (α = 0.66). Participants also completed Webster and 
Kruglanski’s (1994) 42-item need for closure scale (α = 0.79) described in Study 3.   
  Participants were also asked to report the racial group they identified with by means of a 
closed-ended question with seven options (African-American or Black; White; Hispanic or 
Latino; Asian; Native American or Aleut; Multiracial; or some other group). Following 
previous research (Aaker and Williams 1998; Escalas and Bettman 2005; Lee, Aaker, and 
Gardner 2000), participants who indicated being White were termed “Westerners,” those who 
indicated being Asian, Hispanic, or Latino were termed “Easterners,” and the rest were 
classified as “others.” 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
  A GLM revealed a significant 3-way interaction between participant ethnicity, socially 
desirable responding, and need for closure (F(2, 129) = 3.74, p < .05). Further, the 2-way 
interaction between participant ethnicity and socially desirable responding was significant 
when need for closure was high (F(2, 67) = 12.51, p < .001), but not when it was low (F(2, 
62) = 1.65, p > .20), per a median split on need for closure. Hence, the relationship between   27 
ethnicity and socially desirable responding was stronger for high need for closure than for 
low need for closure participants. 
Further analyses shed light on the distinct relationships for the high and low need for 
closure participants. When need for closure was high, Westerners scored significantly higher 
on self-enhancement (MWesterners = 6.85, MEasterners = 6.12; t(64) = 2.88, p < .01) and lower on 
impression management (MWesterners = 4.80, MEasterners = 5.12; t(64) = -2.04, p < .05) than 
Easterners. In contrast, when need for closure was low, the two ethnicities did not differ on 
impression management (MWesterners = 5.04, MEasterners = 4.99; t(58) = 0.26, p > .79; figure 2). 
Although Westerners (M = 6.71) scored higher on self-enhancement than Easterners (M = 
6.20; t(58) = 1.95, p < .06) when need for closure was low, as predicted, this relationship was 








Insert figure 2 about here 
_____________________________ 
Further, as in Study 3, the predicted effects on self-enhancement were driven both by 
low (vs. high) need for closure Westerners self-enhancing less (MLow NFCC = 6.70, MHigh NFCC = 
6.85) as well as by low (vs. high) need for closure Easterners self-enhancing more (MLow NFCC 
= 6.20, MHigh NFCC = 6.12). Similarly, the predicted effects on impression management were 
driven both by low (vs. high) need for closure Easterners scoring less (MLow NFCC = 4.99, MHigh 
NFCC = 5.12) as well as by low (vs. high) need for closure Westerners scoring more (MLow NFCC 
= 5.04, MHigh NFCC = 4.80). This issue is elaborated in the general discussion.   28 
    These findings suggest when need for closure was high, Westerners had a greater 
tendency to engage in self-enhancement than Easterners, who in turn had a greater tendency 
than Westerners to engage in impression management. In contrast, when need for closure was 
low, cultural differences in both self-enhancement and impression management were 
attenuated. These findings provide further support for the different moderating role of need 
for closure (H3a and H3b) from that of cognitive busyness (H2a and H2b) on the culture - 
socially desirable responding link using different measures of socially desirable responding 




The preceding two studies support the moderating role of need for closure in the 
association between culture and socially desirable responding. In Study 5, we tested whether 
these relationships have implications for judgments and self-presentations. Specifically, we 
examined whether need for closure influenced cultural differences in respondents’ predictions 
regarding their future behaviors or outcomes in the context of relevant consumption scenarios. 
Because people with an independent (vs. interdependent) self-construal have a greater 
tendency to engage in self-enhancement, we predicted that they will also be more likely to 
present their actions in ways that make one appear self reliant when they have a high need for   29 
closure. Similarly, because people with an interdependent (vs. independent) self-construal 
have a greater tendency to engage in impression management, we predicted that they will 
also be more likely to present their likely actions as normatively appropriate when they have 
a high need for closure. Following H3b, we predicted that these relationships will be 
significantly attenuated for low need for closure participants.   
A pretest (N = 284) was conducted to empirically derive a set of consumption scenarios 
relevant to either self-reliance or image protection. Participants responded to 5 scenarios – 2 
to tap self-reliance and 3 to tap image protection - constructed to reflect everyday situations 
that consumers are likely to encounter. A factor analysis with principal component analysis 
and varimax rotation with eigenvalues greater than 1 revealed that the self-reliance and 
image-protection scenarios loaded on distinct factors. The self-reliance and image protection 
scenarios were averaged separately to form indices of self-reliance and image protection. As 
predicted, the “self-reliance index” significantly correlated with Paulhus’ self-enhancement 
scale (r = 0.35, p < .001), whereas the “image-protection index” significantly correlated with 
Paulhus’ impression management scale (r = 0.40, p < .001). 
 
Method 
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One hundred seventy two undergraduate students at a large university participated in 
exchange for class credit. These participants were shown the five scenarios (2 for 
self-reliance and 3 for image protection) mentioned earlier. An example of a self-reliance 
scenario follows:   
Some time back, you purchased a new camcorder. Apparently, you were one of the first 
few customers to buy it, and a manufacturer’s representative calls you with a request to 
write your opinion about the camcorder. He adds that your write-up would be published 
in the company’s weekly. How confident are you of being able to express your opinion 
frankly? (1=Not at all confident, 9 = Very confident).   
An example of an image protection scenario follows: 
You are traveling in another town and you find yourself at a large souvenir store, choosing 
between some items. Suddenly, one of the items you’re considering slips from your hand 
and falls to the floor, breaking into pieces. You know that this store has a “you break it you 
bought it” policy. Fortunately, nobody saw you and you could easily walk out of the store 
without anyone knowing. How likely would you be to walk away without telling a store 
employee? (1 = very likely, 9 = not at all likely). 
Participants were asked to predict their judgment or behavior in each scenario. In the 
first scenario noted above, it was expected that respondents engaging in self-enhancement 
would be more likely to present themselves as confident in their ability to write the article   31 
candidly. In the second scenario, it was expected that respondents engaging in impression 
management would be more likely to present themselves as honest and not likely to walk away 
without telling a store employee. Participants also completed the 42-item need for closure scale 
(α = 0.82; see Study 3 for sample items) and Triandis and Gelfand’s (1998) 16-item scale 
anchored by 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly agree) to measure chronic independent (8 
items; α = 0.73) and interdependent (8 items; α = 0.76) self-construals. A sample item to 
measure the independent self was “I’d rather depend on myself than others.” A sample item to 
measure the interdependent self was “If a coworker gets a prize, I would feel proud.”  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
We predicted that cultural differences in the tendency to present oneself as self-reliant or 
normatively appropriate will be stronger for high (vs. low) need for closure participants. For 
the purposes of this study, independents were defined as those scoring high on the 
independence scale and interdependents were defined as those scoring high on the 
interdependent scale, both using median splits. Respondents scoring high on both scales were 
excluded. Participants high and low on the need for closure scale were also determined using 
a median split. A GLM with the self-reliance and image protection scenario indices entered 
as repeated measures revealed a significant 3-way interaction between culture, need for   32 
closure, and scenario type (F(1, 66) = 5.06, p < .05). The 2-way interaction between culture 
and scenario type (self-reliance or image protection) was significant when need for closure 
was high (F(1, 40) = 13.86, p < .002), but not when it was low (F(1, 26) = 0.02, p > .88), 
suggesting that cultural differences in self-reliance and image protection indices were 
stronger for high (vs. low) need for closure participants. 
Contrasts revealed that when need for closure was high, participants with an 
independent self had significantly higher scores on the self-reliance index than those with an 
interdependent self (MIndependents = 7.03, MInterdependents = 5.85; t(40) = 2.25, p < .05), who in 
turn had higher scores on the image-protection index (MIndependents = 4.42, MInterdependents = 5.49; 
t(40) = -2.45, p < .02). However, when need for closure was low, independent and 
interdependent participants did not differ on either the self-reliance index (MIndependents = 6.53, 
MInterdependents = 6.65; t(26) = -0.21, p > .83) or the image protection index (MIndependents = 5.20, 
MInterdependents = 5.18; t(26) = 0.03, p > .97). These findings replicate those of Studies 3 and 4 
using consumption scenarios instead of individual-difference measures of socially desirable 
responding and using chronic measures of cultural orientation.   
It should be noted that we obtained similar results when the independent and 
interdependent self were used as continuous instead of discrete measures. When need for 
closure was high, positive correlations were observed between the independent self and the 
self-reliance index (r = 0.37, p < .001), and between the interdependent self and the image   33 
protection index (r = 0.30, p < .005), As predicted, however, when need for closure was low, 
the relationships between independence and the self-reliance index (r = 0.15, p > .19), and 
between interdependence and the image protection index (r = 0.22, p > .05), were 







 =.02; for 







As in the previous studies, two distinct effects were responsible for the predicted effect 
of need for closure on cultural differences in socially desirable responding. The effects on 
self-enhancement were driven both by low (vs. high) need for closure independents 
self-enhancing less (MLow NFCC= 6.53, MHigh NFCC= 7.03) as well as by low (vs. high) need for 
closure interdependents self-enhancing more (MLow NFCC= 6.65, MHigh NFCC= 5.85). Similarly, 
the effects on impression management were driven both by low (vs. high) need for closure 
interdependents scoring less (MLow NFCC = 5.18, MHigh NFCC = 5.49) as well as by low (vs. high) 
need for closure independents scoring more (MLow NFCC = 5.20, MHigh NFCC = 4.42). 
Collectively, these findings extend those of the previous studies by showing systematic 
differences in the self-presentational response strategies used by high and low need for 
closure consumers on marketing scenarios. Specifically, we found that the relationships 
observed in prior research (cultural differences in responses to scenarios tapping self-reliance 
or image protection) were obtained for high need for closure participants, suggesting that   34 
their desire for consensus led them to follow their culturally congruent response style. When 
need for closure was low, however, as predicted, these relationships were significantly 
weaker. These findings further support the distinct manner in which cognitive busyness and 




Collectively, the five studies support the distinct effects of cognitive busyness and need 
for closure on cultural differences in socially desirable responding (i.e., impression 
management vs. self-enhancement) using a variety of measures and manipulations. In Study 1 
cognitive busyness attenuated participants’ tendency to engage in impression management 
but not self-enhancement, suggesting that the former is more deliberate and effortful. 
Accordingly, we predicted and found in Study 2 that cognitive busyness mitigates cultural 
differences in impression management, but not self-enhancement. In contrast, because need 
for closure enhances reliance on culture-congruent response styles (Chiu et al. 2000; Fu et al. 
2007), we found in Studies 3-5 that cultural differences in both self-enhancement and 
impression management are increased when respondents have a high (vs. low) need for 
closure. 
   35 
Theoretical and Methodological Implications 
 
These findings advance our theoretical and methodological understanding of 
cognitive busyness, need for closure, and socially desirable responding in a number of ways. 
First, our findings shed light on how cognitive and motivational demands in the survey 
context impact cultural differences in socially desirable responding. Second, the procedures 
used in the experiments permit the separation of cognitive versus motivational influences on 
behavioral control. Specifically, although prior research has treated cognitive busyness and 
need for closure interchangeably (de Dreu 2003; Kardes et al. 2004; Ford and Kruglanski 
1995), our findings highlight their distinct influence. Cognitive busyness decreased cultural 
differences in impression management, whereas need for closure increased them. Cognitive 
busyness did not affect cultural differences in self-enhancement, whereas need for closure 
increased them. As such, the common practice of using cognitive busyness and need for 
closure as proxies of each other may not be well advised. 
Third, our studies distinguish between the two types of socially desirable responding 
in terms of the processing resources required to engage in them. Whereas impression 
management is found to be resource dependent in that a decrease in the ability to control 
one’s actions disrupts it, self-enhancement requires minimal cognitive resources and occurs 
spontaneously (also see Knowles and Condon 1999). Fourth, although considerable prior   36 
research has examined the link between culture and response biases (e.g., Baumgartner and 
Steenkamp 2001; Lalwani et al. 2006; Lalwani and Shavitt 2009), limited research has 
examined the boundaries of these relationships. Our research is one of the first to examine 
factors that influence the strength of these relationships. 
Fifth, studies 3-5 showed that a high (vs. low) need for closure influences cultural 
differences in socially desirable responding in two distinct ways simultaneously: First, by 
increasing a given culture’s tendency to engage in culture-congruent socially desirable 
responding (i.e., the tendency of participants with an independent [interdependent] self to 
engage in self-enhancement [impression management]) and second, by decreasing the other 
culture’s tendency to engage in culture-incongruent socially desirable responding (i.e., 
independents’ tendency to engage in impression management, and interdependents’ tendency 
to engage in self-enhancement). These findings are in line with the valuation and the 
devaluation effects, which suggest that while goal-congruent activities are valued more and 
pursued more vigorously, goal-incongruent activities are devalued and pursued less 
vigorously. For instance, research suggests that consumers with a high (vs. low) need to 
smoke are directionally more likely to participate in a raffle promising cigarettes (valuation 
effect). In contrast, those with a low (vs. high) need to smoke are more likely to participate in 
a raffle promising cash, instead (devaluation effect; Brendl, Markman, and Messner 2003). In 
our studies, high need for closure increased the tendency of participants with an independent   37 
(vs. interdependent) self to engage in self-enhancement (impression management), but 
decreased their tendency to engage in impression management (self-enhancement), although 
not significantly so. 
 
Contributions to Practice 
 
By pointing to factors that increase or decrease respondents’ tendency to pursue 
culture-characteristic socially desirable responding, our findings could lead to the 
development of strategies to attenuate such response styles. For instance, the simple tactic of 
playing background music during a survey may increase cognitive busyness and reduce 
respondents’ tendency to engage in impression management. The present findings may also 
enable survey researchers to anticipate how strong socially desirable responding is by 
assessing the pertinent cognitive and motivational factors in the survey environment. 
Our findings may also have implications for retailers of premium versus generic 
brands. People may purchase premium brands that are publicly consumed (e.g., Nike athletic 
shoes) for impression management reasons and those that are privately consumed (e.g., 
Johnny Walker Scotch whisky) for self-enhancement reasons. In a retail setting, cognitive 
busyness (e.g., imposed via music being played in the store; see Study 2) may lower 
consumers’ impression management tendencies and reduce their preference for premium   38 
brands of publicly consumed goods, perhaps, in favor of generic brands. The same may not 
be true for premium brands of privately consumed goods fulfilling self-enhancement motives, 
which are impervious to cognitive load. Hence, depending on the brand (premium or generic) 
they want to push, retailers of publicly consumed products may induce or ease cognitive load 
among their customers to boost sales. 
 
Motivation versus Cognition 
 
  As discussed earlier, research suggests that motivation and cognition are intimately 
intertwined. Despite numerous efforts, previous research has not been able to disentangle the 
effects of the two (Kruglanski 2001; Tetlock and Levi 1982). This led to the belief that their 
effects are similar and prompted the use of motivational (e.g., need for closure) and cognitive 
(e.g., cognitive busyness) variables as proxies of each other (de Dreu 2003; Kardes et al. 
2004). However, an understanding of their distinct effects can be useful not only in isolating 
the underlying mechanisms and in building theory, but also in developing tactics to influence 
consumer behavior. For instance, as noted above, different levels of cognitive busyness can 
influence the attractiveness of premium or generic brands. If need for closure is distinct from 
cognitive busyness, as we demonstrated, the effects of the two may diverge.   39 
An interesting issue arising from our findings pertains to the boundary conditions 
when cognitive busyness and need for closure will have similar versus dissimilar effects. 
Although our studies were not meant to address this issue, we speculate that an examination 
of the degree of ability and motivation required to accomplish tasks can potentially shed 
insights on these boundary conditions. When both the ability and the motivation required to 
accomplish tasks is high (e.g., when engaging in impression management), or when the 
ability required is low but motivation required is high (e.g., when engaging in 
self-enhancement), cognitive busyness and need for closure may have different effects, as 
suggested by our studies. However, when the ability required for the task is high but the 
motivation to pursue it is low, need for closure and cognitive busyness may have the same 
effects. Accordingly, Webster et al. (1996) and Webster and Kruglanski (1994) found that 
high (vs. low) cognitive busyness and high (vs. low) need for closure resulted in greater 
primacy effects in evaluating a hypothetical job candidate – a task that requires some degree 
of ability to evaluate credentials, but little personal motivation, given the relevance of the task 
to the experimental participants. 
Our findings support the model proposed by Briley and Aaker (2006), who 
demonstrated that culture based differences arise when people process information in a 
cursory, spontaneous manner, but these differences disappear when people engage in more 
deliberative processing. Given that deliberative processing has been associated with greater   40 
need for cognition (Kardes et al. 2004), and need for cognition negatively correlates with 
need for closure (Chiu et al. 2000; Kardes et al. 2004; Webster and Kruglanski 1994), it is 
likely that deliberative processing and need for closure have opposite effects. Specifically, 
deliberative processing should decrease reliance on cultural norms, and reduce cultural 
differences, as observed by Briley and Aaker (2006), whereas need for closure should 
increase them, as observed in the current as well as previous research (Chiu et al. 2000; Fu et 
al. 2007). 
The current investigation has several limitations. Because the data were collected 
using student samples in laboratory settings, our findings may have limited generalizability. 
Nevertheless, in light of the converging evidence from multiple studies and the underlying 
theories we draw from, our results seem reasonably robust. Further, we measured but did not 
manipulate need for closure. Future research should attempt to replicate our findings by 
manipulating need for closure. Future research should also use a state measure of cultural 
orientation (i.e., independence and interdependence) to test the mediating relationship 
between self-construal prime, cultural orientation, and socially desirable responding 
(self-enhancement and impression management), both under conditions of high (vs. low) 
cognitive busyness and high (vs. low) need for closure.   41 
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FIGURE LEGENDS 
FIGURE 1 
THE EFFECT OF COGNITIVE BUSYNESS ON SDE AND IM SCORES IN STUDY 1 
 
NOTE.- SDE: Self-deceptive Enhancement, IM: Impression Management, RD-16: RD-16 
scale, MCSD: Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, PDS: Paulhus deception scales 
 
FIGURE 2 
THE EFFECT OF NEED FOR CLOSURE (NFCC) ON SDR DIFFERENCES BY 
RESPONDENT ETHNICITY IN STUDY 4 
 
NOTE.- SDR: Socially Desirable Responding; SDE: Self-deceptive Enhancement, IM: 
Impression Management.   50 
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